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Let the lot be shaken for all of you, and see who is chosen 
Iliad, VII, 171. 
 
 
 
 
Casting the dice puts judgement quarrels to rest and keeps powerful parts separated 
Proverbs 18:18. 
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Abstract 
Sortition, i.e., random appointment for public duty, has been employed by societies 
throughout the years, especially for duties related to the judicial system, as a firewall 
designated to prevent illegitimate interference between parties in a legal case and agents of 
the legal system. In judicial systems of modern western countries, random procedures are 
mainly employed to select the jury, the court and/or the judge in charge of judging a legal 
case, so that they have a significant role in the course of a case. Therefore, these random 
procedures must comply with some principles, as statistical soundness; complete auditability; 
open-source programming; and procedural, cryptographical and computational security. 
Nevertheless, some of these principles are neglected by some random procedures in judicial 
systems, that are, in some cases, performed in secrecy and are not auditable by the involved 
parts. The assignment of cases in the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) 
is an example of such procedures, for it is performed by a closed-source algorithm, unknown 
to the public and to the parts involved in the judicial cases, that allegedly assign the cases 
randomly to the justice chairs based on their caseload. 
In this context, this article presents a review of how sortition has been employed historically 
by societies, and discusses how Mathematical Statistics may be applied to random procedures 
of the judicial system, as it has been applied for almost a century on clinical trials, for 
example. Based on this discussion, a statistical model for assessing randomness in case 
assignment is proposed and applied to the Brazilian Supreme Court in order to shed light on 
how this assignment process is performed by the closed-source algorithm. Guidelines for 
random procedures are outlined and topics for further researches presented. 
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Introduction 
The judicial systems of modern western states make use of randomization procedures, that 
is, important decisions in the course of a judicial case are made by rolling the dice. This may 
be perceived as an unnatural or counter-intuitive expedient. Why should the flip of a coin 
take part in casting the fate of a legal case? Why should we abdicate of making (best- 
informed) deterministic decisions? Next section addresses these questions, after a brief 
historical review. The following two sections make a statistical analysis designed to test the 
effective randomness of case assignment in the Brazilian Supreme Court. Last section gives 
our final remarks. 
Running Democracy and Rolling the Dice 
The city-state of Athens was the undisputed champion in the use of sortition (random 
appointment) for managing its public affairs, especially in the period between the democratic 
reforms of Kleisthenes, in 507 BCE, and the fall of Athenian democracy, in 322 BCE; see 
Dowlen (2009), Hansen (1999), Headlam (1933) and Staveley (1972). While some 
specialized officers were elected based on specific expertise and experience, like military 
chiefs, water supply and treasury managers, religious priests etc., most of the public duties 
in Athens were carried out by citizens of the polis, that held short term positions appointed 
by a system based on district representation, sortition and frequent rotation. 
Sortition was also used to constitute dikasteria, citizen’s courts where dike (fair 
justice) was served. From a total of approximately 30,000 man recognized as qualified 
citizens (excluding women, slaves, foreigners and their descendants and other non- 
represented categories), 6,000 district representatives would be selected to the general 
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assembly and, out of those, 501 individuals would be randomly chosen to constitute a 
dikasterion. Some specially important cases would require a larger court of justice, with up 
to 2,501 members! Moreover, in contrast to contemporary jurors, dikastai swore by the 
Heliastic Oath not to discuss the case in judgement among each other. In contrast, each 
dikastes should vote, by secret ballot, according to his individual and independent opinion, 
expressing his own best knowledge of the law and concern for the public good; see Hansen 
(1999, p.182). 
The Hebrew bible uses randomization devices for several purposes, including 
ritualistic divination and judgement, and also as a practical tool for appeasement or fair 
distribution of goods and services; see for example Leviticus 16:8-10, Numbers 26:56, 
1Chronicles 26:13, Proverbs 16:33 and Jonah 1:7. Biblical use of randomization was a strong 
argument for its practical adoption for political and legal procedures in Christian Europe, 
notwithstanding moral objections to gambling and philosophical concerns about voluntarily 
relaxing the grip of reason and relinquishing important decisions to fate. 
Late Medieval and Renaissance Italy (12th to 17th century) saw many political 
experiments in the use of sortition to randomly appoint citizens for legislative and executive 
positions or legal functions, the two most important prototypes being the Florentine scrutiny 
and the Venetian brevia; see Najemy (1982) and Wolfson (1899). In England and the United 
States sortition was (and still is) mostly used for jury duty appointment, with mandatory 
random selection officially documented since the 17th century; see Dowlen (2009). Today, 
judicial systems of many western countries use randomization procedures to select the jury 
and/or the court in charge of judging a legal case.  
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All of the aforementioned historical examples include the appointment of jurors and 
judges by complex procedures involving a mixture of the following aspects: (1) Pre-selection 
of a pool of able or qualified candidates; (2) Voting or election by secret ballot; (3) 
Proportional representation constraints (by district, tribe or family, corporate guild, 
professional specialty, etc.); and, finally, at some point(s) in the appointment process, (4) 
Sortition, i.e., random selection among possible candidates. 
Based on surviving original manuscripts and secondary literature, the references in 
this section give detailed accounts of how sortition was used in several historical examples. 
However, the original sources give us very little explanation of why sortition was used. 
Archaic religious texts see the ritual use of randomization devices as a doorway for the 
manifestation of divine will, but the aforementioned civilizations quickly realized that 
sortition also brought important practical advantages. Nevertheless, the articulation of good 
rational arguments for the use of sortition and randomization had to wait the development of 
Mathematical Statistics in the 20th century. This is the topic of our next section. 
Decoupling, Separation and Haphazardness 
Why do we randomize? Legal systems of modern societies use sortition as a firewall, a 
technological barrier designed to prevent spurious communication of vested interests or 
illegitimate interference between parties in a legal case and agents of the legal system. Its 
purpose is to warrant im-partial or non-partizan justice, literally, assure that no party (person, 
group of persons or social organizations), directly or indirectly involved or interested in a 
legal case, could illegally intervene or manipulate the due legal process.  
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Judges and jurors do not come to court as blank slates. They had a life history full of 
experiences that formed individual opinions, prejudices and idiosyncrasies. Hence, the 
opportunity given to a party to divert the case to a sympathetic judge or to select favorable 
jurors would constitute a virulent manipulation mechanism. 
A similar situation is faced by statisticians and physicians when planning and 
conducting clinical trials, i.e., studies designed to test the performance of a newly proposed 
or alternative treatment for a given disease. For the sake of treatment comparison, patients 
taking part in the clinical trial have to be divided into a control-group, receiving an old 
treatment, a placebo, or no treatment whatsoever; and a treatment-group, receiving the newly 
proposed treatment. Giving the opportunity, participating patients would manifest their 
preferences, and try by all means possible to get their preferred choice of treatment. Wealthy 
and well-educated patients would be better informed, would make better choices, would be 
in better position to get their preferred treatment, but would also probably have better chances 
to overcome the disease and get well anyway. Hence, such confounding effects would ruin 
the very investigative purpose of the clinical trial; see Pearl (2004) and Stern (2008). 
As well known by contemporary scientists, randomization is the key instrument used 
in statistics to overcome this difficult conundrum. In this context, decoupling refers to 
randomization techniques aiming to eliminate systematic vulnerabilities to uncontrolled 
influences received from or exerted by participating agents; see Lauretto et al. (2012, p.195). 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), Joseph Jastrow (1863-1944) and Ronald Aylmer Fisher 
(1890-1962) introduced the key concept of randomization in Mathematical Statistics, as 
succinctly expressed by Judea Pearl in the following quotation; see also Peirce and Jastrow 
(1884), Fisher (1926), Fisher (1935), and Stern (2008).  
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Fisher's great insight was that connecting the new link to a random coin flip 
‘guarantees’ that the link we wish to break is actually broken. The reason is that a 
random coin is assumed to be unaffected by anything we can measure on macroscopic 
level - including, of course, a patient's socioeconomic background. (Pearl, 2000, 
p.348) also quoted in Stern (2008, p.59). 
 
Pearl (2000) further develops the axiomatic study of related issues, and encodes the concepts 
of decoupling by randomization in the language of abstract inference diagrams, giving the 
all-important formal definition of d-separation. Furthermore, Dennis Lindley (1923-2013) 
uses the word haphazardness to clearly distinguish between the desired effect of decoupling, 
from randomness, the tool used to achieve it; see next quotation. 
The Role of Randomization in Inference: We describe a possible allocation that the 
experimenter judges to be free of covariate interference as haphazard. 
Randomization may be a convenient way of producing a haphazard design. We argue 
that it is the haphazard nature, and not the randomization, that is important. (Lindley, 
1982, p.438-439), also quoted in Fossaluza et al. (2015, p.173). 
 
Notwithstanding the important conceptual distinction highlighted by Lindley, 
randomization remains the most basic and fundamental tool used to achieve decoupling in 
modern statistics. Nevertheless, this conceptual distinction opens the possibility for 
improvement, by development of more efficient techniques used to render well-decoupled 
designs; see for example Stern (2008), Lauretto et al. (2012), Fossaluza et al. (2015), and 
Lauretto et al. (2017). Finally, the consistent use of randomization techniques as well as the 
compliance with the implied protocols can be investigated and audited with tools provided 
by Mathematical Statistics and computational data analysis; this is the goal of the next 
sections. 
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Statistical Modelling of Case Assignments 
A model to assess randomness in case assignment may be applied to the following abstract 
scenario. Suppose there is a courthouse constituted of n judges and that new cases arrive daily 
and must be assigned to one of them. Also, assume that it is of interest to study the mechanism 
of case assignment of the courthouse, in order to outline the existence or not of a bias towards 
assigning cases to a specific judge, under particular circumstances. To meet this goal, the 
probability of a new case being assigned to each judge, under given circumstances, may be 
modelled. 
In order to fit such a model, a sample of case assignments is needed. The sample must 
contain the number of cases that were assigned to each judge daily for a fixed period of time. 
Furthermore, it must also present the circumstances under which such case assignments 
occurred. These circumstances are represented by variables that summarize the daily 
conditions of the courthouse regarding possible sources of bias on the assignment process. A 
reliable characterization of the daily conditions of the courthouse is essential, for it is 
desirable to model any source of bias on the case assignment process, so that any bias still 
present on the fitted model is due to randomness or an unknown source. As an example of 
known bias on case assignment, consider the scenario in which a case fits the related-case 
rule, so that it is assigned to a specific judge without partaking any random process. It is 
important that the circumstances under which this case was assigned be presented in the 
sample so that it may be incorporated to the model, as this is a known source of bias that 
alters the assignment probabilities of this specific case. 
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The model to be fitted is a Multinomial Logistic Regression, which is presented in 
details in the appendix. This regression models the probability of a case being assigned to a 
judge as a non-linear function of numerical variables that represent the conditions under 
which the case is assigned. Other kinds of known sources of bias, which may not be 
represented by numerical variables, may also be incorporated to the model. 
Case study of the Brazilian Supreme Court 
The abstract model outlined on the preceding section is now fitted to a sample of case 
assignments of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal). The sample 
contains the number of cases of each class assigned to each justice chair4 of the court between 
February 28 2008 and July 10 2017. At the considered period of time, cases of 35 different 
classes were assigned to the 11 chairs of the court, although only 14 classes of cases are 
considered, as there were less than a thousand cases of the other classes assigned over the 10 
year period, as they are somewhat rare when comparing to the top 14 classes. Considering 
only the assignments of the top 14 classes, the sample amounts to 22,720 assignments.5 
Table 1 presents the number of cases of each class that were assigned during the 
considered period of time for each justice chair, and Figure 1 presents the proportion of the 
cases of the class Special Appeal with Aggravation that were assigned daily for each chair. 
It can be seen that there are some justice chairs that systematically receive a greater 
                                                         
4 The Brazilian Supreme Court is formed by justice chairs, each one having a minister. When a 
minister retires, its caseload is transferred to the newly appointed minister of his chair. Therefore, in 
order to follow the caseload of each minister over time, it is convenient to consider that the cases are 
assigned to the chair, not to the minister. 
5 One for each day and class. If in a day there were assigned cases of m different classes, then there 
were m random samples in this day. 
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proportion of cases of this class for a period of time, although this may be explained by some 
kind of known source of bias and may not be evidence of lack of randomness in the case 
assignment process. 
Table 1. Number of cases assigned by class to each justice chair during the considered period 
of time6. 
Class 
Justice Chair 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Precautionary Action (AC) 271 268 234 255 198 231 231 248 220 200 213 2569 
Originating Civil Action (ACO) 214 172 204 213 143 180 156 189 146 190 196 2003 
Direct Unconstitutionality Action (ADI) 212 159 147 230 157 160 134 197 171 156 177 1900 
Bill of Review (AI) 16229 18353 14172 14644 9452 16226 17664 14605 14941 11445 10256 157987 
Special Appeal with Aggravation (ARE) 37605 16848 20278 20184 19936 17789 9569 19988 13063 33778 19998 229036 
Habeas Corpus (HC) 6535 3854 4529 4630 3436 4056 3349 4447 3708 5249 4249 48042 
Inquiry (Inq) 216 166 183 200 172 194 153 198 216 189 106 1993 
Injunction Order (MI) 672 601 592 607 398 485 553 573 451 449 560 5941 
Writ of Mandamus (MS) 696 597 670 693 638 1347 426 661 671 379 642 7420 
Petition (Pet) 198 169 187 181 367 127 137 214 276 331 126 2313 
Extraordinary Appeal (RE) 17021 13352 11518 12240 8891 13730 11181 12031 10759 17891 7565 136179 
Habeas Corpus Appeal (RHC) 599 398 472 451 393 403 326 459 276 543 439 4759 
Writ of Mandamus Appeal (RMS) 169 145 168 153 117 125 137 161 96 101 147 1519 
Complaint (Rcl) 3198 2007 2039 2537 1789 2018 1454 2190 1784 2702 2119 23837 
Total 83835 57089 55393 57218 46087 57071 45470 56161 46778 73603 46793 625498 
 
                                                         
6 The name of the classes were translated from Portuguese. Their abbreviations are kept as they are 
in Portuguese. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of cases of the class Special Appeal with Aggravation assigned daily to 
each chair. The dotted line represents the 0.10 proportion, which is the proportion of cases 
that is expected to be assigned to each chair if the assignment process is performed randomly. 
This class of case was created in 2011 and the period of time in which a chair systematically 
receives no case refers to when the chair was empty. 
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The case assignment process of the Brazilian Supreme Court has some known sources 
of bias that must be controlled. Indeed, although 11 justice chairs form the court, at least one 
of them is unavailable for receiving new cases, as one of the ministers is the court president 
and, therefore, occupies the presidency chair and does not receive new cases from the random 
assignment process7. Furthermore, there may be other empty chairs, for when a minister 
retires, his chair remains empty for a period of time, until a new minister is appointed by the 
President of the Republic and approved by the senate. Indeed, these are known sources of 
bias that are included in the model as a missing data mechanism and not as numerical 
variables that describe the circumstances of the case assignment. In Statistics, a sample with 
missing data is such that some values of its variables are missing, i.e., are not known; see 
Little and Rubin (2014). In the present case, it is not known how many cases would have 
been assigned to the chair of the president minister if it was available for receiving cases in 
a given day, what characterizes a missing data situation. The missing data mechanism in the 
case at hand is structured, i.e., the mechanism that causes the missing data is known, and, 
thus, can be modelled. Introducing the missing data factor into the model, it becomes a 
Multinomial Logistic Regression Model with Missing Data, for which more details are given 
in the appendix. 
Another source of bias is the existence of the related-case rule, by which some cases 
are not randomly assigned, but are directly assigned to a specific chair that is handling related 
cases. However, the available sample does not distinguish the cases that were randomly 
                                                         
7 The court president receives cases that are exclusive to the presidency chair. Therefore, the president 
minister does not partake on the random assignment process. 
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assigned from the cases that were not and, therefore, this source of bias cannot be 
incorporated to the model. 
The model for the Brazilian Supreme Court considers only one variable describing 
the circumstances under which each case assignment was performed. The variable considered 
in our analysis is the proportion of cases of each class that has been assigned to each chair 
since 2001 to the day of the assignment. In fact, at each day, this proportion is updated by 
the cases assigned at the previous day. It is important to consider this variable for the court 
claims that the assignment is performed based on this quantity, so that chairs with high 
proportion have lower probability of being assigned a new case of the class. However, the 
court does not disclose how the assignment algorithm takes into account this proportion when 
assigning cases. Therefore, the probability of a chair receiving a new case of a given class is 
modelled as a non-linear function of the proportion of cases of the class assigned to the chair 
since 2001 to the day of the assignment. This non-linear function differs from one chair to 
another and from one class to another. 
Figure 2 presents the confidence intervals for the probabilities of a new case of a 
given class being assigned to each chair, under the circumstance that each justice chair has 
received 1/11 of the cases of the class since 2001 to the assignment date. These intervals were 
estimated by the Multinomial Logistic Regression detailed in the appendix. From the 
estimated intervals, we see that, in all classes, the probability of a chair receiving new cases 
is always less than 0.30, so that there are not evidences of great biases on the assignment 
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process. Nevertheless, apart from class AC, in which all intervals contain8 1/11, for all other 
classes we reject that the probability is the same for all chairs, i.e., the difference between the 
probabilities of assignment are statistically significant. However, the difference is not 
practically significant on most of the classes, as the probabilities are homogeneous, though 
different (see classes AI, Inq and RHC for example). 
On the other hand, there are classes in which some chairs have a higher probability 
of receiving a new case (see classes ADI, ARE, MS, Pet and RMS for example). In these 
classes, even though all chairs have the same proportion of cases, some of them have a higher 
probability of receiving a new case, what points to the existence of some bias on the 
assignment process. However, this bias may not be part of the assignment process itself, but 
be rather caused by some variable that is not being taken into account by our model (as the 
related-case rule, for example). Therefore, though we see that the probability of some chairs 
receiving a new case is greater, we cannot conclude that the process is biased (at least not 
without further studies taking into account other factors that may bias the process). 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
8 So that we do not reject the hypothesis that the probability of a new case being assigned to a chair 
is equal for all chairs. 
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Figure 2: Confidence intervals for the probabilities of a new case of a given class being 
assigned to each justice chair, under the circumstance that each chair has received 1/11 of the 
cases of the class since 2001 to the assignment date, estimated by the Multinomial Logistic 
Regression. The confidence of the intervals is 99% and they are corrected by the Bonferroni 
method (Neter et al., 1990, p.164). 
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Final Remarks and Future Research 
What we can conclude and what we cannot 
The statistical analysis in the preceding sections give us a global assessment of the allocation 
process. Although we detect deviations from expected statistics, indicating the existence of 
systematic biases on the random allocation of judicial cases, we cannot make any conclusions 
about the fairness or appropriate randomization process of any individual judicial case. Such 
a conclusion cannot be reached by post-hoc statistical analysis of historical data. 
Furthermore, the systematic biases may be created by sources that, tough unknown on the 
dataset at hand, are known to the court, as the cases that fit the related-case rule, for example. 
Nevertheless, given the juridical and social importance of this theme, we believe that 
it is important to develop software and procedures for randomization in compliance with the 
following desiderata: (a) Statistical soundness; (b) Procedural, cryptographical and 
computational security; (c) Complete auditability; (c) Open-source programming; (d) 
Multiple hardware platform and operating system implementation; (d) User friendliness and 
transparency; (e) Flexibility and adaptability for the needs and requirements of multiple 
application areas (like, for example, clinical trials, selection of jury or judges in legal 
proceedings, and draft lotteries). This is an important topic of further research. 
Final remarks 
Stern (2008), Lauretto et al. (2012), Fossaluza et al. (2015) and Lauretto et al. (2017) 
reconsider the notion of decoupling, as used in statistics, with the purpose of allowing multi- 
objective optimization of (approximate) separation criteria together with other desired goals, 
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like (bounded) proportional representation criteria. Originally developed in the context of 
clinical trials, these methods could be easily adapted to applications in the legal system. 
In contrast to other jurisdictions, Brazilian courts of appeal allow formation of review 
panels by spontaneous aggregation of judges. Indubitably, this factor has important impacts 
in the properties of the appeal process concerning statistical randomization. The issues 
addressed in the previous paragraphs, and several correlated matters constitute interesting 
topics for further research. 
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Appendix: Technical details 
In this appendix, we present the details of the Multinomial Logistic Regression that 
is applied to the Brazilian Supreme Court. This regression model aims to model the logarithm 
of the odds in favor of a case being assigned to a justice chair over a so-called reference chair 
under given circumstances. The mathematical structure of the model imposes that a reference 
chair is fixed so that the probability of a case being assigned to a chair is compared with the 
probability of this same case being assigned to the reference chair through the respective 
odds. The logarithm of the odds is then modelled as a linear function of the numerical 
variables that represent the courthouse circumstances at the moment of the assignment. For 
more details about Logistic Regression models see Hilbe (2009). 
Let 𝐽 be the variable that indicates to which justice chair a given case is to be assigned. 
This variable takes values in {1,… , 𝑛}, as each one of the 𝑛 chairs may be represented by a 
number. Also, let (𝑥1,𝑗, … , 𝑥𝑘,𝑗) be a set of numerical variables that represent the 
circumstances of the chair 𝑗 when the assignment occurred, and define (𝑣1, … , 𝑣𝑛) as 𝑣𝑗 = 1 
if the chair 𝑗 ∈ {1,… , 𝑛} is available for receiving cases, and zero otherwise. Note that 𝑣𝑗 
introduces a structured missing data mechanism into the model, i.e., the mechanism that 
causes a chair to be empty. Considering that the reference chair is the number 1 and that 𝑣1 =
1, i.e., the reference chair is always available for receiving cases, the Multinomial Logistic 
Regression with Missing Data may be written as 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃 (𝐽 = 𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1, … , 𝑥𝑗,𝑘), (1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑛))
𝑃 (𝐽 = 1|(𝑥𝑗,1, … , 𝑥𝑗,𝑘), (1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑛))
) = 𝛽0
(𝑗) + 𝛽1
(𝑗)𝑥𝑗,1 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑘
(𝑗)𝑥𝑗,𝑘 𝑖𝑓 𝑣𝑗 = 1
𝑃 (𝐽 = 𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1, … , 𝑥𝑗,𝑘), (1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑛)) = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑣𝑗 = 0
(1) 
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for 𝑗 = 2,… , 𝑛, in which 𝑃 represents probability. Observe that in model (1) each chair has 
its own parameters, though we can restrict this model making some parameters equal for all 
chairs. In addition, for simplification, we consider that all chairs have the same number 𝑘 of 
parameters, what is not necessary. 
In order to estimate the parameters 𝛽0
(𝑗)
, … , 𝛽𝑘
(𝑗)
, 𝑗 ∈ {2,… , 𝑛}, of the model by the 
Maximum Likelihood Method it is necessary to have a sample (𝒀, 𝑽, 𝑿) of size 𝑚 given by 
𝐕 = ((𝑣1,1, … , 𝑣1,𝑛),⋯ , (𝑣𝑚,1, … , 𝑣𝑚,𝑛))  
𝐘 = ((𝑦1,1, … , 𝑦1,𝑛),⋯ , (𝑦𝑚,1, … , 𝑦𝑚,𝑛))  
𝐗 = ((𝐱1,1, … , 𝐱1,𝑛),⋯ , (𝐱𝑚,1, … , 𝐱𝑚,𝑛))  
𝐱𝑠,𝑗 = (𝑥𝑠,𝑗,1, … , 𝑥𝑠,𝑗,𝑘); 𝑠 = 1,… ,𝑚; 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛  
in which 𝑦𝑠,𝑗 is the number of cases assigned to chair 𝑗 at assignment 𝑠; 𝑣𝑠,𝑗 equals one if 
chair 𝑗 was available for receiving cases at assignment 𝑠 and zero otherwise; and 𝐱𝑠,𝑗 are the 
numerical variables that describe the circumstances of chair 𝑗 at assignment 𝑠. The likelihood 
of the model may be written as 
𝐿(𝛃) ∝ ∏ ∏ (
𝑣𝑠,𝑗 exp(𝛽0
(𝑗)
+𝛽1
(𝑗)
𝑥𝑠,𝑗,1+⋯+𝛽𝑘
(𝑗)
𝑥𝑠,𝑗,𝑘)
1+∑ 𝑣𝑠,𝑙
𝑛
𝑙=2  exp(𝛽0
(𝑙)
+𝛽1
(𝑙)
𝑥𝑠,𝑙,1+⋯+𝛽𝑘
(𝑙)
𝑥𝑠,𝑙,𝑘)
)
𝑦𝑠,𝑗×𝑣𝑠,𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑚
𝑠=1   
with the convention that 𝛽0
(1)
= 𝛽1
(1)
= ⋯ = 𝛽𝑘
(1)
= 0. The estimates ?^?0
(𝑗)
, … , ?^?𝑘
(𝑗)
, 𝑗 ∈
{2, … , 𝑛}, of the parameters are obtained by maximizing the likelihood presented above, and 
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the probability of a new case being assigned to chair 𝑗, under new circumstances 𝐗𝑚+1 =
(𝐱𝑚+1,1, … , 𝐱𝑚+1,𝑛) and 𝐕𝑚+1 = (𝑣𝑚+1,1, … , 𝑣𝑚+1,𝑛) is estimated by 
𝑃(𝐽 = 𝑗 |𝐗𝑚+1, 𝐕𝑚+1) =
𝑣𝑚+1,𝑗 exp(?^?0
(𝑗)
+?^?1
(𝑗)
𝑥𝑚+1,𝑗,1+⋯+?^?𝑘
(𝑗)
𝑥𝑚+1,𝑗,𝑘)
𝑣𝑚+1,1+∑ 𝑣𝑚+1,𝑙
𝑛
𝑙=2  exp(?^?0
(𝑙)
+?^?1
(𝑙)
𝑥𝑚+1,𝑙,1+⋯+?^?𝑘
(𝑙)
𝑥𝑚+1,𝑙,𝑘)
  
again with the convention that ?^?0
(1)
= ?^?1
(1)
= ⋯ = ?^?𝑘
(1)
= 0. Confidence intervals for these 
probabilities may also be obtained applying the properties of Maximum Likelihood 
Estimators (Rao, 1973, Chapter 5). 
We will consider six distinct models for the Brazilian Supreme Court that are 
particular forms of (1). In the first model, we suppose that the logit (1) depends on the class 
of the case and on the proportion of cases assigned to the chair since 2001, and that both the 
effect of class and proportion depend on the chair: 
{
 
 
 
 
log(
𝑃(𝐽 = 𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1, … , 𝑥𝑗,15), (1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣11))
𝑃(𝐽 = 1|(𝑥𝑗,1, … , 𝑥𝑗,15), (1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣11))
) = 𝛽1
(𝑗)𝑥𝑗,1 +⋯+ 𝛽15
(𝑗)𝑥𝑗,15 if 𝑣𝑗 = 1
𝑃 (𝐽 = 𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1, … , 𝑥𝑗,15), (1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣11)) = 0 if 𝑣𝑗 = 0
  
for 𝑗 = 2,… , 11, in which 𝑥𝑗,𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … ,14},
9 if the class of the process is the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ and 
zero otherwise, and 𝑥𝑗,15 is the proportion of cases of the class assigned to chair 𝑗 since 2001. 
There are 150 parameters in this model, one for each class and chair (140) and one for each 
chair that refers to the proportion (10). In this model, not only the probability of a case being 
                                                         
9 We represent the classes by numbers as it makes the notation clearer. We may number the classes 
in an arbitrary order, without loss of generality. 
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assigned to a given chair depends on the proportion of cases of this class assigned to it since 
2001 and the class of the case, but also the dependence depends on the chair, i.e., the effect 
of the proportion and the class on the probability is different for each chair. 
In model 2, we suppose that the logit (1) depends on the proportion and on the class, 
but the effect of the class is the same for all chairs, while the effect of the proportion depends 
on the chair: 
{
log (
𝑃(𝐽=𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1,…,𝑥𝑗,15),(1,𝑣2,…,𝑣11))
𝑃(𝐽=1|(𝑥𝑗,1,…,𝑥𝑗,15),(1,𝑣2,…,𝑣11))
) = 𝛽1𝑥𝑗,1 +⋯+ 𝛽14𝑥𝑗,14 + 𝛽15
(𝑗)
𝑥𝑗,15 if 𝑣𝑗 = 1
𝑃(𝐽 = 𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1, … , 𝑥𝑗,15), (1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣11)) = 0 if 𝑣𝑗 = 0
  
for 𝑗 = 2,… , 11, in which 𝑥𝑗,𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … ,14}, if the class of the process is the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ and 
zero otherwise, and 𝑥𝑗,15 is the proportion of cases of the class assigned to chair 𝑗 since 2001. 
Note that in this model we restrict the parameters of model 1 to 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖
(2)
= ⋯ = 𝛽𝑖
(11)
 for 
all 𝑖 ∈ {1,… ,14}. Model 2 has only 24 parameters, one for each class (14), and one for each 
chair (10), which refers to the proportion. 
Model 3 is a reduction of model 2, which supposes that the probability depends on 
the class and the proportion, but not on the chair, i.e., the effect of class and proportion is the 
same for all chairs: 
{
log (
𝑃(𝐽=𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1,…,𝑥𝑗,15),(1,𝑣2,…,𝑣11))
𝑃(𝐽=1|(𝑥𝑗,1,…,𝑥𝑗,15),(1,𝑣2,…,𝑣11))
) = 𝛽1𝑥𝑗,1 +⋯+ 𝛽15𝑥𝑗,15 if 𝑣𝑗 = 1
𝑃(𝐽 = 𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1, … , 𝑥𝑗,15), (1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣11)) = 0 if 𝑣𝑗 = 0
  
for 𝑗 = 2,… , 11, in which 𝑥𝑗,𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … ,14}, if the class of the process is the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ and 
zero otherwise, and 𝑥𝑗,15 is the proportion of cases of the class assigned to chair 𝑗 since 2001. 
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This rather simple model has only 15 parameters, one for the proportion and one for each 
class. 
In model 4, we suppose that the probability does not depend on the class, but only on 
the proportion and on the chair: 
{
log (
𝑃(𝐽=𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1),(1,𝑣2,…,𝑣11))
𝑃(𝐽=1|(𝑥𝑗,1),(1,𝑣2,…,𝑣11))
) = 𝛽0
(𝑗)
+ 𝛽1
(𝑗)
𝑥𝑗,1 if 𝑣𝑗 = 1
𝑃(𝐽 = 𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1), (1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣11)) = 0 if 𝑣𝑗 = 0
  
for 𝑗 = 2,… , 11, in which 𝑥𝑗,1 is the proportion of cases (of a given class) assigned to chair 𝑗 
since 2001. This model has only 20 parameters, two for each chair, and supposes that the 
case class does not affect the probability of assignment. 
Model 5 is analogous to model 4, as we suppose that the probability does not depend 
on the proportion, but only on the class and the chair: 
{
log (
𝑃(𝐽=𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1,…,𝑥𝑗,14),(1,𝑣2,…,𝑣11))
𝑃(𝐽=1|(𝑥𝑗,1,…,𝑥𝑗,14),(1,𝑣2,…,𝑣11))
) = 𝛽1
(𝑗)
𝑥𝑗,1 +⋯+ 𝛽14
(𝑗)
𝑥𝑗,14 if 𝑣𝑗 = 1
𝑃(𝐽 = 𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1, … , 𝑥𝑗,14), (1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣11)) = 0 if 𝑣𝑗 = 0
  
for 𝑗 = 2,… , 11, in which 𝑥𝑗,𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … ,14}, if the class of the process is the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ and 
zero otherwise. This model has 140 parameters, one for each class and chair, and supposes 
that the assignment is not affected by the proportion, but only by the chair and the class. 
Finally, model 6 supposes that the probability depends only on the proportion: 
{
log (
𝑃(𝐽=𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1),(1,𝑣2,…,𝑣11))
𝑃(𝐽=1|(𝑥𝑗,1),(1,𝑣2,…,𝑣11))
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑗,1 if 𝑣𝑗 = 1
𝑃(𝐽 = 𝑗|(𝑥𝑗,1), (1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣11)) = 0 if 𝑣𝑗 = 0
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for 𝑗 = 2,… , 11, in which 𝑥𝑗,1 is the proportion of cases (of a given class) assigned to chair 𝑗 
since 2001. This model supposes that the probability does not depend on the chair nor the 
class, but only on the proportion of cases assigned since 2001, and has only 2 parameters. 
In order to properly choose a model for the Brazilian Supreme Court, we performed 
Likelihood Ratio Tests to test hypothesis of interest. The models’ log-likelihoods, the 
hypothesis being tested and the p-value of the tests are presented in Table 2. The hypothesis 
always refer to model 1, i.e., suppose that model 1 is the true model, but the assumptions of 
the hypothesis. As we reject all hypothesis in Table 2, we choose model 1 as the one that 
better represents the case assignment process of the Brazilian Supreme Court. This is the 
model used to estimate the probabilities and confidence intervals in Figure 2. 
Model ll df 
Chi-
squared 
p-value Hypothesis 
1 -1431800.65 - - - - 
2 -1447745.67 126.00 31890.05 < 0.0001 
The effect of class is the same on all 
chambers 
3 -1452492.20 135.00 41383.10 < 0.0001 
The effect of class and proportion is the 
same on all chambers 
4 -1436513.10 130.00 9424.91 < 0.0001 There is no effect of class 
5 -1433758.38 10.00 3915.46 < 0.0001 There is no effect of proportion 
6 -1454554.17 148.00 45507.05 < 0.0001 
There is no effect of class and the effect 
of proportion is the same on all 
chambers 
 
